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SCENES FROM A LAw FiRM*
Lisa G. Lerman**
INTRODUCTION
What follows is one lawyer's description of his experiences at a law
firm where he worked for fifteen months from the fall of 1993
through 1994. The lawyer, whom I call "Nicholas Farber," offered to
share these stories because he was troubled by many things that had
happened at this law firm. He agreed to allow me to publish the
stories only if neither he nor the firm would be identified, because
some of the stories involve serious misconduct. Farber determined
not to report the firm to the disciplinary authorities, but instead to
recount some of what happened at his law firm so that these practic-
es could become the subject of discussion and policy development.
Small factual changes have been made to obscure the identity of the
* For other windows into otherwise private worlds, see generally Lisa G.
Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1990) (exploring whether and
when lawyers deceive clients, using examples from confidential interviews with
twenty lawyers); Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Scenes from a Clinic, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1978) (describing a law school clinic in which students are able
to explore in-depth personal and group relationships with clients, colleagues, and
teachers); Scenes from a Marriage (directed by Ingmar Bergmann, produced by
Lars-Owe Carlberg 1973) (exploring the private conflicts between one husband and
wife).
** Associate Professor and Director, Law and Public Policy Program, The
Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; BA. 1976, Barnard
College, Columbia University; J.D., 1979, New York University School of Law;
LL.M., 1984, Georgetown University Law Center. This article was co-authored with
the lawyer whom I call "Nicholas Farber." Because of the sensitivity of the
material and the need for confidentiality, he decided not to identify himself as a
co-author. Initially Farber told me these stories during a tape-recorded interview. I
transcribed portions of the tape, edited the transcript, and organized the stories
into a draft. Farber then reviewed the draft and made some stylistic and other
changes. The research for this article was supported by grants from the law
schools of The Catholic University of America and George Washington University.
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firm and the lawyers discussed. In every important respect, however,
this narrative is faithful to Farber's account.'
I have not sought or received corroboration for any of these stories
because I could not do so and continue to protect Farber's anonymity.
I know Farber to be a person of integrity, and I believe the account is
truthful.2 Farber was motivated to tell these stories by a desire to
improve the legal profession. After Farber's stories I offer some com-
ments on some of the questions raised by this account.
"Nicholas Farber" graduated from law school in 1990. He clerked
for a judge for a year, and then spent a couple of years at a small
insurance defense firm in a medium-sized town. Then he got a new
job at a larger insurance defense firm located in a big city on the
East Coast. The firm had about fifty lawyers, roughly three associ-
ates for each partner.
THE INTERVIEW
An idealistic beginning
When I started at the firm it was ten years old. The firm began as
an offshoot of another firm that had been downtown.... The found-
ing partner at my firm disagreed with the philosophy of the firm he
came from. One of his main concerns was that he didn't think that
they were promoting young associates to equity partner quickly
enough. He thought he could do a better job of building a firm where
people would have lives as well as jobs. He ... and four or five asso-
ciates from this firm... became equity partners at the new firm. ....
The idea was there would be a five-year partnership track for others.
1. The interview with "Nicholas Farber" was conducted on May 8, 1996. I
reproduced portions of the transcript of the interview with minor editing. I altered
verb tense for consistency and omitted many connecting words such as "and," "so,"
and "because." I changed some pronouns from singular to plural, and sometimes
substituted a noun for a pronoun. Other omissions are noted by ellipses.
I have not included ellipses between paragraphs, but only where material is
omitted from within a paragraph. I have made a few changes from the original
transcript in the order in which the excerpts are presented. I include some of the
questions I asked "Farber," and follow the narrative with some observations about
the stories he tells.
2. I do not mean by this statement to assert that all of these stories are
"true" in an absolute sense. Farber may have had wrong or incomplete information
in some instances. I believe his account to be truthful in that he lacked any inten-
tion to deceive. Sissela Bok defines deception to include "messages meant to mis-
lead [others] ... through gesture, through disguise, by means of action or inac-
tion, even through silence." SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LIFE 14 (1979).
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I worked at this firm as a summer associate between my second
and third year of law school.... At that point, it was a wonderful
place to work. But things changed. In the ten years from when they
started the firm till I came on board, the equity partnership track
increased from five years to seven years. When the first associate
came up for equity partner, they instituted a two-tier partnership
track. So they made the associate a non-equity partner after seven
years. Then it was four more years before they made him a full equi-
ty partner. To date he is the only one who has been made an equity
partner since the firm started.
What has happened to others who came up for partnership?
Most have been let go .... Six others have been made non-equity
partner, and of those six one was fired later.... The non-equity
partners have no voting rights. They don't go to all the partnership
meetings.... The partners also created an advisory committee,
which consisted of the initial equity partners. I've been told by other
associates at the firm that the initial equity partners are the only
ones who can vote. Even the newest equity partner can't vote.
The attitude of the partners was like little boys. A "you have to
worship us" mentality. I was told frequently that I had to come in
before the first partner shows up, and I had to circulate a couple of
times a day throughout the firm so that all the partners would see
me. I wasn't supposed to leave until the last partner went home.
Several people told me that when the partners pull into the parking
lot they should see my car there.
How many hours were associates expected to bill each year?
2000 hours for associates. Partners always billed at least 2000.
2000 was your target. They would always say, "If you fall short it's
no big deal." But that was a lie. If you fell short you were not eligible
for a merit bonus. They had an elaborate set of criteria to determine
who would receive a merit bonus, and they said it would not be tied
strictly to billable hours. However, the partner I worked for said they
had to acknowledge associates who were billing lots of hours and
bringing all this money into the firm, so they certainly would get
bonuses. Those who got significant bonuses typically billed well over
2000.... I heard the highest number of hours a lawyer at the firm
billed in a year was 2600.
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Why did you leave the firm?
I quit without having lined up another job because I got fed up.
Every time somebody who had worked at the firm longer than I had
quit, their work would land on my desk. I would be left holding the
bag on a bunch of cases that somebody had not done a great job on
because they knew they were leaving anyway.
I was the fourteenth associate in fifteen months to resign. After
eighteen months had passed from the date that I began, 50 percent
of the associates had quit or been fired.
You've got to "add value"
From the very beginning... I was told that "We are not out to
churn out five Cadillacs or Mercedes-Benzs a year, what we are here
to churn out is 150 Fords." "We'd rather that you would do a C job on
150 cases than an A job on fifty cases." "You have to 'add value' to
the firm." That comment came in repeatedly .... "We're paying you
X amount of dollars and it's costing us this much to keep you on
board, so you have to find a way to make yourself profitable." Much
of this instruction came from associates with seniority; they were
trying to tell me how to survive at the firm. The partners never said
these things to me, but it was clear that the partners rewarded those
who worked by this philosophy.
That usually meant handling a large number of cases and doing a
B grade job. It had nothing to do with doing quality legal work, or
client maintenance, or establishing long-term relationships with
clients. "Adding value" meant churning out as many billable hours as
you could and doing as much marketing as you could.
A "discount law firm"
We were told by the partners ... that we could do a lot of this
billing that we did... because our rate was so low.... The client
was only paying $75 or $80 per hour for associates, so what did you
care if you padded the bill for three times that because that is what
we are worth. The firm was a "discount law firm" for this one insur-
ance company. That is why we got so many of their cases.... We
were supposed to be billing at rates much lower than most places.
Some of the partners in the firm reluctantly acknowledged that
the way the firm was being managed fell short of their ideals... but
they felt compelled to run the firm this way in order to survive eco-
nomically. No firm is perfect, and these lawyers believed they were
providing expertise to their clients at ridiculously low rates, so they
did whatever they had to do to survive. If they didn't do it, the firm
would not survive, and some other firm would get the business.
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How much money were the lawyers earning?
The starting salary for associates was $48,000. There were sup-
posed to be automatic $4,000 raises for the first three years to avoid
competition among new associates. After the first three years, there
were supposed to be merit increases. The firm changed the automatic
increase policy after I came on without telling the associates. The
step increase was only $2,000. So after a year my salary went up to
$50,000; I didn't get a bonus, I think mainly because I didn't bill
nearly 2,000 hours.
Do you know how much the partners were earning?
Some non-equity partners made somewhere around $100,000 their
first year. The lowest on the equity totem pole was making in excess
of $200,000, and the highest was making close to half a million....
That's what I was told by other associates who had been there
awhile. I have no way of knowing whether this is true.
What criteria were used in evaluating associates?
The evaluation was partly substantive but they would always tell
me that my billings were too low. They said I needed to find ways to
improve that, because that's very important.
Why were yours low?
I billed honestly.... I billed 1600 to 1800 hours a year.... At one
point they told me that I had the lowest billable hours in the firm. I
didn't think that was possible, because I had just had a conversation
with another associate who told me that her hours only added up to
1450. But that was part of their game.... to tell you that you are
the lowest in your group and maybe the lowest in the firm. I guess
they thought that news like this would shame me into billing more
hours.
I was always in the office by seven and I tried to leave by five-
thirty. I rarely took a full hour for lunch. I just closed my door and
tried to work as much as I could. I didn't want to spend evenings and
weekends there if I didn't have to. Nobody spent as much time at
work as I did, but they billed more. When I asked, "I'm here all the
time, why don't my hours add up to as much as the other associates'
do?" The partners would say, "Well they are taking work home."
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"Okay, here's the deal"
The partners were very careful not to instruct us to do dishonest
billing. Early on, a partner came to see me and said, "Your hours are
the lowest in the practice group, maybe the lowest in the firm." The
partner said: "So and so's billing 2200 hours, why don't you go and
talk to him? See if he can show you anything. Maybe you are not
writing things down, or maybe you are not billing for things that you
should be. Go find out what he's doing." And... they sent me to the
most senior associates in the group, who had played the game.... I
went to see two people. They each closed the door behind me and
said, "Okay here's the deal."
The first lawyer gave me this tip: "You have. .. fifty or sixty
files.... You need to find a reason to make a telephone call to some-
body involved in each file." He said something like: "You think about
it, you've got the client, you've got experts, you've got opposing coun-
sel. Think of all the people you can call. Find a reason to call some-
body. Make the call. You bill for the call. When you hang up the
phone you immediately do a confirmatory letter. Then you bill for the
letter. And if the adjuster will let you, you do a memo to the adjust-
er... on what transpired during the call. Then bill for the memo. So
you bill three times per call." And he said, "A month shouldn't go by
without this happening at least once to every case." In other words,
create a reason, and then create a bunch of work to go with it, and it
looks like you are just being on top of the situation.
If you billed in tenths of hours, did two minutes count as a tenth?
The timekeeping wasn't really that accurate. You'd get on the
phone and talk, but... you'd bill the telephone call and confirmatory
letter... at .5. Some people would actually put .6 for this, the senior
associate told me. .5 you could get away with, .4 would be unques-
tioned.... He was telling me how to gauge how much I could
squeeze out of each piece of work by thinking about how it looked
rather than how much time it actually took.
The magic number
The other associate said ... he just kept a list of the tasks that he
did each day and tried to keep an estimate of the time it took for
each task. At the end of the day he would add it all up. If it didn't
equal 8.6, he would just inflate it so that it did. I said, 'hy the
magic number 8.6?" He said, "Well, that's the number of hours you
need to bill every day in order to get three weeks paid vacation and
all your holidays off. That's how you make sure you make your 2000
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hours. So if you just make sure that every day that you come into
work you bill at least 8.6 hours, you're fine." So there's a technique.
Crank out the forms
Many people told me that a good technique to increase one's bill-
able hours was to crank out these forms-discovery requests, inter-
rogatories, requests for production of documents-they are on the
machine.... We use them for every single case. You change a few
things specific to the case that you are working on and you bill as if
you had created it from scratch.... You could really make some
money billing there.
How did you decide how much to bill for each task?
Habit.... I would ask another lawyer: "How much did you bill for
that?" and he would say "Oh, .8." I would ask: "Well how did you
arrive at that?" The other lawyer would say, 'That's just what we
bill. Everybody does." I think if you bill too many .5s and 1.0s, it
looks as if you are faking it. Therefore they used smaller fractions.
Easy billing
One lawyer told me... he was happy because he was involved in
one case in which there were a lot of parties. He would get a lot of
pleadings that didn't require him to do much of anything except to
read them and know what was happening .... If one party filed a
motion.., and he was not going to oppose it,... he would read the
documents, and bill for that time. Sometimes... they would serve
discovery on other parties, and he wouldn't even read the documents,
but he would bill for it: . . . "receipt and review of the following:"
That's how he made up his time, by whatever came in the mail. He
could bill as if he had read it.
This associate got the highest merit bonus that year. He got a
$16,000 bonus. They are grooming him.... He's playing the game
the way they wanted him to play it, so he'll be made a non-equity
partner at some point.
Triple billing
I was routinely told to double and triple bill my time. If I spent an
hour doing one thing, the partner would urge me to find a way to do
three things in that hour. Then I could bill three different hours to
three different clients. For example, the partner told me that he
wanted me to get a car phone and carry a dictaphone with me all the
time because I spent a lot of time driving ... to depositions, court
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hearings, and things like that. That time in the car, he said, was
wasted time. I said, "I bill for the travel time." He said, "You could be
billing for the travel time, reviewing things at stop lights, making
telephone calls, or dictating deposition summaries. You could be
billing for all of that."
This happened in 1994. The 1993 formal opinion by the ABA on
hourly billing practices was out.3 I had heard about it from the judge
I clerked for.... I showed it to the partner. I said, "This isn't legal
anymore."
What did he say?
Nothing. It was just kind of... danced around. His attitude was
that his recommendations... would save me time. ... These tasks
were going to have to get done, so why should you have to do it on
the weekend when you could be doing it in the car. I remember this
very distinctly. I said, "I kind of thought the rule was if you didn't do
the work you can't bill for it. How can you ever bill for more time
than you actually spent working?" I never got answers.
I didn't want to get a dictaphone and a car phone.... I didn't
want to have a traffic accident. I felt I had enough on my mind going
to and from court.... I didn't want to have to be doing deposition
summaries and making phone calls while I'm driving anyway....
But beyond that, I need to think to do work well. I can't think while
I'm in traffic driving back from court. I can't do a good depo summa-
ry. I wanted to be sure of what I was doing. I wanted to be able to
close the door and sit down in my office and do a good solid depo
summary.... Because I was inexperienced, I wanted to think things
through, do a thorough job. It seems all they were concerned about
was volume.
Their response was, again, that analogy. You are trying to make a
Mercedes and we want you to make a bunch of Fords. I never did get
a car phone. They mentioned that in my review: 'This is the informa-
tion age, you've got to take advantage of it if you want to be success-
ful."
A few helpful suggestions
There was one senior associate who was up for non-equity partner
that year. He came in my office and asked me about a personal inju-
ry case that I was working on. I thought he was being helpful... he
3. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 379
(1993) [hereinafter Formal Op. 3791 (discussing billing practices for professional
fees, disbursements and other expenses).
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was the firm "schmoozer."... I thought he was asking me questions
about the case because he was trying to get to know me and help me
out. He'd give me pointers about what I might consider doing on the
case. I welcomed the help because I couldn't get answers from other
partners and associates. They were all so busy.... He would pop in
and ask me about this one single case. I would follow his sugges-
tions... He was the senior-most associate .... He was in a different
practice group from me.
I later found out that he was getting a percentage of every billable
hour... because he had brought the case to the firm .... If you
brought that case to the firm, the firm would pay you.., say 10
percent of whatever the billables were. So he was helping his own
interests. He wanted me to bill as many hours as possible because he
was getting a check.
I'd go do this stuff thinking, "Look, well, he may be right," and "I
never thought of that."... So I'd be billing and billing and billing,
and he'd be going $800, $900, $1,000. This was going on for a long,
long tim..... He'd come in every month.
I don't think he ever asked me to do something that should not
have been done. But it was certainly at odds with the firm's mentali-
ty that we are not trying to turn out a bunch of Cadillacs.... I
thought... that he was telling me what was expected of me at the
firm.... I thought... I'll do a good job on this case. I'll show it to
my partner.... He'll say, "This is great!" He won't know how I fig-
ured out how to do this.
When I was leaving the firm, he said, "Who is going to handle that
case?" I said, "I'm not really sure. Why?" He said, "Well, I've got to
figure out how much money I'm going to be making each month." I
said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "Well, I brought that
case in." That is when I finally put two and two together.... He
became a non-equity partner.
Just 150 photocopies
Sometimes I'd be reviewing a pre-bill and I'd look under "costs"
and I'd see "150 copies." I didn't make 150 copies .... Someone had
used the code for that particular case .... Every once in a while
you'd pick up a file and the file was paper thin. There hadn't been
any activity on it for a year, and yet there are 150 photocopies
charged to that file.... I'd go back to the partner and say, "Look
somebody's been using the wrong code." And he would say, "Well,
there's nothing we can do about that." I'd say, "Are we going to
charge it to that client?" He goes, "Well it's the same client .... It's
the insurance company that pays the bill, so whether it is on that file
or another .... What difference does it make?" It's a big faceless,
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giant insurance company. What's 150 copies at twenty cents a page?
Well, it's exactly that amount.
Fifteen hours of paralegal time
There was a rule for this particular client that no more than fif-
teen hours of paralegal time could be billed for a single case. If you
had to use more than that, you had to get permission in advance
from an adjuster.... The lawyers often got too busy and they asked
paralegals to do work that lawyers were supposed to do.... In some
cases the paralegals would come in and say, "I've hit my fifteen hour
limit" and stop.... Other times they would work and work and
work, and bill and bill and bill. Then you'd get a pre-bill that said
"Paralegal time: 65 hours." If the bill went to the insurance company
that way, the adjuster would just.., subtract fifty hours.... So
when the pre-bill came out, if there were more than fifteen hours of
paralegal time, we were told to turn them into attorney time. In
other words, you didn't do the work, but just say you did.
I am not sure whether the client was billed at attorney rates for
the same number of hours worked or whether the firm computed the
difference in the billing rate and reduced the number of hours ac-
cordingly.., but I think they didn't bother to change the rate. One
of the outgoing associates who had resigned as I was coming in men-
tioned to me: "You know this place is so ridiculous, it's so unethical.
They routinely.., bill any paralegal time over fifteen hours to the
attorneys, and they don't even change the rate."
On one occasion I went to my partner and said, 'There's all this
paralegal work on the pre-bill that is over the fifteen hour limit....
What should I do about it?" He said, 'Well whatever is over, just
make sure that the narrative describing the work reads properly and
then change the initials to yours." I said, "But I wasn't even at the
firm when this work was done!" He said, "Well then, bill it as the
attorney who was here during that time period so there won't be any
question."
He wasn't thinking. He didn't even realize that I wasn't working
there during that time period. We couldn't put my initials on it .... I
said, "Who's going to do the math?" He gave me this really scared
blank look. I said, 'There's a difference in rate between attorneys
and paralegals." He said, "Oh, oh yeah, bring it to accounting. They
will do it." I did bring it to accounting. I have no idea whether they
ever did anything about it or not.
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Billing off the secretaries
People routinely billed off their secretaries .... They'd give their
secretaries a list of phone calls to make... and tell them to keep a
list of how long it took for each call. Then at the end of the day, the
secretary would hand the attorney a list of telephone calls.... The




How do you know?
They told me how to do it. In fact, I shared a secretary with anoth-
er associate, and she said, "Do you want me to keep track of my
time?" I said, "Why would you keep track of your time?" "So you can
bill on it," she said.
Did they bill for secretarial time?
No.
So the only reason that a secretary would have been keeping
time...
... would be so that her attorney.., could bill for the time.
That's when I said, "Correct me if I'm wrong, but if you don't do
the work, you can't bill for it." That seems like a really easy rule. But
it wasn't that cut and dry there. Their position was that "you would
have done the work anyway, so what's the difference if she tells them
what time a deposition is or if you tell them?" The difference is law
school and the bar exam. It's as simple as that .... That's how they
made their 2000 hours.
Pressure to pad
The associate merit bonus program was completely tied to billable
hours.... The partners denied that. They would say, "It's a wide
range of factors that we take into consideration ... pro bono
work.... bar functions,... community service,... marketing,...
all these.., wonderful things that make you a well-rounded spirited
participant here at the firm." But when the list came out, anybody
under 2000 didn't get a bonus, and almost everybody over 2000 got a
bonus. The more an associate's hours exceeded 2000, the bigger the
bonus.... The associates who got the biggest bonuses were not the
19981 2163
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ones who worked the hardest. That was really clear. They were some
of the ones who had taught me some of these tricks.
Did you pad your bills at all in response to that pressure?
I did, to a certain extent. I remember thinking, "I'm going to have
to do something here so I don't get fired."... I'd pad them enough
that I felt I wasn't going to get fired but.., it wasn't going to put
me in contention for a massive bonus. I was just going to skate the
line till I could get out of there.
I had called the judge I clerked for and talked to him about the
situation. He said, "Don't even do that." I said, "But the reality of it
is that they are going to fire me." His response was "They are proba-
bly not going to fire you, at least not right away. What you need to
do is decide that you don't want to work there and get another job."
I immediately started looking for another job. Then it got to a
point where I said, "I don't want to have to go to work every day and
play tug of war with my conscience." ... That's when I decided to get
out as soon as I could. It was a survival technique at that point. And
that's what made the work every day so miserable. I knew what I
was doing was ripping the company off. The other lawyers were okay
with it because it was this big faceless insurance company.... I
found some solace in the fact that it was a huge corporate giant.
I knew three months into my time there that I wanted out....
Others advised me that "You've at least got to find a way to stick it
out for a year. If you quit before a year, it looks like you got fired."
The only reason I stayed longer than a year is that I thought I would
get a bonus, so I waited until the bonuses were announced. That got
delayed a couple of months. I resigned after they were announced.
Is there anybody who wasn't padding bills?
Oh yes. They were usually the lawyers who quit on their own, or
who were constantly being harped on (like I was) for not meeting the
billing requirements. It usually took people about a year to figure out
what it is that they were trying to get you to do. And then you either
stay and play the game or you leave.
There were two partners who billed honestly. They routinely billed
in the 2000-2100 range each year. But they had no lives--they
worked seven days a week, ten to twelve hour days most of the time.
I heard that one of the partners even had to come home from a vaca-
tion in Europe to handle some matter-the work became their entire
focus in life. And some of the associates who "played the game" even
made disparaging comments about the honest-billing partners behind
their backs.
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Call it "research"
We were instructed very early on that you should never bill for a
conference with another attorney in the firm because the client won't
pay for attorneys talking to each other.... You had to bill it as legal
research or as something else.
This was something they specifically told you?
Yeah. Again, most of the time it was other associates relaying
these instructions. But there were partners who told me this as well.
Twelve reasons to file a motion
When I was clerking for the judge.., we would have as many as
120 civil motions a week. It became really clear to me that'a lot of
lawyers who bill by the hour... would rather file a motion than pick
up the telephone.... You can only bill once for a telephone call, but
if you fie a motion, you can bill for drafting it, researching it, finaliz-
ing it, and filing it, and then for scheduling the hearing, preparing
for the hearing, traveling to the hearing, waiting for the hearing to
begin, conducting oral argument, traveling back to the firm, calling
the client, and sending a confirmatory letter. Twelve things you could
bill for that you would never have had to do if you just picked up the
phone and said, "When can you get those discovery responses?"
There are rules that require you to... communicate before filing
a motion, but the lawyers... just go through the motions. They send
letters saying: "If I don't have discovery responses within seven days
of the date of this letter, I'm going to file a motion." Then they bill
for the letters. And then seven days go by and they fie the motions.
Discovery motions are usually on forms on your computer. You
just blurt those out and bill however many hours it takes you to do
it. But it takes you no hours because it's a form. You change the
caption, make a few factual adjustments, and fie it. That one was
really evident to me and to the judge. We saw these things repeated-
ly.
From the bench he would say, "Couldn't we have solved this with-
out wasting all this time by making a phone call?"... and the law-
yer would... claim that the work was legitimate. We all knew what
was going on.
Billing for tickling
Our malpractice insurance... required that we have a tickler
system in place. I have no problem billing for the tasks that I was
required to do as a result of the fie being tickled by a partner, but
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partners would routinely pick up files and tickle them, and bill for
the tickling.... They would say, "review the file," .2, .3, .4, or what-
ever. I felt that was kind of crossing the line.... I was already bill-
ing for the time I spent on the case.... This is part of their respon-
sibility to their malpractice insurance carrier, not to the client. But
they figure they are going through the files, so they are entitled to
bill the client for that. I think everybody was trying to find a way
to ... make money instead of lose valuable income-producing time.
Hit it for .5
If you thought about a fie while you were mowing the lawn over
the weekend, you were to come in Monday and bill it .5, because you
were thinking about that file.... If you woke up in the middle of the
night because you were worrying about a case, and you couldn't get
back to sleep because you were thinking about things that had to be
done.... the first thing you were supposed to do when you woke up
in the morning was "hit" that file for .5.... Half an hour. "Well,
what do you call it?" I would ask. "Review of fie, plan strategy for
discovery," I was told.
If you and some of the other associates at the firm went to a ball
game, and at the ball game you talked about a file, in other words if
something productive came up ....
Someone told you this?
Yeah.... if you talked about a case at the ball game you could bill
for that time. Just because you didn't do the work in the firm doesn't
mean that it shouldn't be billed.
Thwarting the auditors
We were told to bill for travel time .... None of us were supposed
to bill more than 8.6 hours in any given day .... The insurance com-
pany would be very suspicious of an eleven hour day. So we were told
sometimes to move hours. If you did the work on that Thursday but
Friday was a lower day, then move some of those hours over there.
But make sure it's not a letter, because the date has to match. But if
it's legal research, then move it, but you need to fit it in so that the
client doesn't become suspicious.
One insurance company client had hired a company to go over its
bills. All of the time manipulation was designed to thwart the guy
checking the bill.
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Billing envy
This is how warped I became there-I remember thinking it would
be so wonderful to work on one of the other litigation teams because
they had really huge cases that lasted five years. The lawyers in that
group would routinely bill eight hours a day to nothing but legal
research. Their bills would never be questioned because there was so
much research to be done that you could bill a forty hour week to
legal research. When they had to file a motion for summary judg-
ment, the whole group spent three weeks living at the firm. That was
the first real legal work that they ever had to do. They used to just
sit around and read a few articles and bill eight.
If I had worked in that group it would have been so much easier
to meet my billables. There wouldn't have been so much pres-
sure.... I remember telling the partner when I was resigning that I
felt like 80 percent of my time there was spent doing administrative
things,... and the other 20 percent was spent on legal work.
This other group didn't have to do any marketing either, because
they had a huge revenue coming in. They billed at higher rates than
we did too. You were considered lucky to be in this group because not
only would you meet your billables without a problem, but you would
be making the firm lots of money! Consequently a lot of the people
who were making non-equity partner were from this group.
A revolving door
At one point I was handed a fie, because someone above me had
left. I was only there fifteen months, and when I left I was the sec-
ond associate from the top in my group of eight attorneys ... . There
were four others below me, all looking to me for guidance on how to
do things. I had never tried a case.
On one case, I was one in a long line of attorneys who had handled
this file in four years.... It had been on the other attorneys' desks
for the same reason. Someone had quit, and it had just been passed
down and passed down.... I had the joy of calling the client and
calling the adjuster and saying, "I'm... going to be handling the X
case." They laughed. Like "Oh who are you?" Picking up the Rolodex
card and changing yet again. In my initial review of the file it
dawned on me that there had never been a status conference on this
case.... We couldn't be assigned a trial date until we had a status
conference.... I kept thinking "That's bizarre. No wonder this case
isn't progressing." . . . I called the court ... to get a hearing set. Two
months later, at the hearing, I settled the case. My client was
thrilled... because I got him a bunch of money, and he was happy
to have the thing done, because it had been four years.
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Wasn't your client the defendant?
We were defendants and we were counter-suing for property dam-
age.
Thinking I had done a really good thing, I went to the partner in
charge, and said "You won't believe it, but I finally settled the X
case. The client's thrilled, I got them tens of thousands of dollars."
And the comment was, he's "glad the client's happy," but he gave me
a list of all the things that I could have done that would have been
"more thorough," that would have achieved a "more favorable result,"
or would have made the client "even happier." What I read was "You
could have billed for this, this, this, this, and this and still achieved
the result, and that's why the file had been open for so long."
I remember saying, "I can't believe the thing's been open for four
years and there hasn't even been a status conference yet." And he
said, "Well what business is it of yours if there is a trial date in the
case? You're the defendant. Isn't it the plaintiffs responsibility to
prosecute his case?" I said, "Well sure, it's his responsibility, but if
my client is sick of having a file hanging over his head for four years
and there is a way to dispose of it quickly, doesn't he kind of call the
shots on that? Aren't I supposed to do what the client wants me to
do?" And his response was "You could have achieved a favorable
result for this client and kept this file going for a while."
The client is the one who pays the bill
We handled lots of cases for an insurance company. As to those
cases, I didn't know who the client was till I had been at the firm
three or four months. I thought the clients were the individuals we
represented. But from my firm's perspective, the client was the in-
surance company because the company paid their bills. You are serv-
ing two masters. I thought it bordered on malpractice that they did-
n't explain that very carefully and then supervise me until I was
comfortable with that relationship.
I started at the firm at the end of September, and by early Novem-
ber, I had eighty files on my desk .... They dumped on my desk the
caseload of a fifth-year associate who left on maternity leave. Their
thought was, "Well, who else is going to do it?" I got seventy or sev-
enty-five files from her, and I was involved in five or six others with
a partner.
There was one specific incident I will never forget. I was told by
"my client," the defendant, that I was not to settle a case without her
permission .... She said, "I don't give a damn what that adjuster
says. The contract says they can't settle anything without getting my
permission first."
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I remember calling the adjuster from the judge's chambers and
saying, "I need to know how much authority I have to settle this
case." He said he thought $5,000. I remember saying, "I need to call
my client." They said, "No you don't." I said, "Yes I do. She told me
that she didn't care what the insurance company said, we need her
permission." And he said, "I'll deal with her. You settle the case."
I caught all sorts of hell for that later on. Not from the defen-
dant,... [blut it ruined my relationship with that adjuster, and the
partners were not happy with me because I wasn't making their
client happy.. . . It was awful.
Whipsaw
When I came on board I got a frantic call from a partner. He need-
ed me to draft a motion for summary judgment .... The motion was
due relatively soon. It was a really big case, and it had kind of fallen
through the cracks. It required me to read everything in the file from
beginning to end, including approximately twenty depositions .... I
had to synthesize what I was going to pull together. I was told to bill
for everything... I think that it was about thirty-five or forty hours
of billable work. I didn't bill for everything because I was conscious
of the fact that some things might have taken me longer because I
was new there ....
The client got the bill and called the firm and complained about
the hours spent on the motion for summary judgment. So the partner
who oversaw the case called the other partner on the case and
said... "How come it took Nick forty hours to write this motion for
summary judgment?" And the partner came back to me and said,
"Why did it take you forty hours?" I just looked at him. I showed him
this pile of stuff, and said, "That's the record in this case. I've only
been here three weeks. I haven't worked on this case. I knew nothing
about it. I had to get up to speed. I've probably spent 120 hours on it,
but I'm only billing for forty."
So he said, "Well, the client's not happy with it. A bunch of other
people have worked on this file .... The client has figured out that
this isn't working out the way it was supposed to." Even so we billed
them for every penny .... We won the motion, so the client didn't
complain any more. But I question the propriety of... billing for the
time it takes you to get up to speed in a file because the firm has lost
yet another associate ....
We billed for every single thing we could possibly bill for. Then if
somebody blew the whistle, we'd talk about finding a way to scale
back our time. But if we thought we could make it fly and it flew,




The partners would tell you that the departing associates all had
very good reasons for leaving. Some wanted to stay home with their
children. Some were moving to Florida. Some of them just got offers
they couldn't refuse. The partners would tell you that no one ever
said a bad thing at their exit interviews.
I talked with some of the people who left. "What did you tell
them?" I asked. They would say, "Well, I told them every single
thing." I was astonished to hear what other associates had said to
partners in their exit interviews. If you believed the partners, the
exit interviews were always complimentary-no complaints, nothing
but good things. But there was this constant state of denial. It was
always "Put on your game face."
I wish I had a nickel for every time this one partner said, "I want
you to be out there talking to the other associates and saying how
great this place is. Be an ambassador of goodwill." We... put on a
facade that there was great morale and that this was a wonderful
place.... Whenever anybody left the partners would say "Isn't it
lovely that he found this or she found that?" My reaction was "Yeah.
They woke up and smelled the coffee and said, 'I don't have to live
like this.'"
Bill-don't talk
There were so many secretaries who came and left. The partners
treated the secretaries worse than they treated the associates....
They always told the secretaries that their pay was commensurate
with what other secretaries in town were making. But it just was-
n't .... Some secretaries had been there for a long time, but they
were partners' secretaries. Partners found ways to reward their own
secretaries....
I even was told at one point by a partner that I was blurring the
line between attorney and support staff and I needed to be conscious
of the importance of that line.
What were you doing?
Socializing. Asking them how their days were. Coming out and
sharing a quick "hello" before I buckled down to get to work. Treat-
ing them like humans. "How was your weekend? What'd you do this
weekend?" The partners hated that. They wanted a very strong de-
marcation between us. Otherwise ... the secretaries would expect
special treatment, or would expect you to bend the rules ....
The partners' favorite method of operation was to avoid face-to-
face contact. The important information was never told to anybody. It
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was always relayed through a memo. If you didn't understand the
memo, then you had to go to the partner. That's how I found out that
my salary increase was going "to be lower than what was promised
and delivered in the past.
A partner could dial directly into your voice mail box. You would
be sitting at your desk, and all of a sudden your message light would
be blinking. So you would check your messages, and it would be the
partner who was three doors down, who didn't want to talk to you
but left you a message.
A number of times I came in at seven o'clock in the morning, and
my message light was blinking. I would check the time that the mes-
sage was left, and it would be 11:30 pm from the partner at home the
night before. It would be in a low monotone "Hi Nick. By the way,
can you do the following:". .. Once you had dumped it on somebody
else's voice mail, it was their responsibility and you didn't have to
worry about it.
Passing the buck
Why didn't they want to talk to each other?
They didn't want the buck to stop at them. For example, if you
didn't come in one day, a partner might say, "Well, I left you a voice
mail, why didn't you check?" It was kind of, "Well, we passed the
buck, it is off my desk. Now it's your responsibility." That was anoth-
er reason I hated going to work there every day. I never knew what
was going to be thrown on my desk at the last minute. And... I
would be responsible because I was the last one left holding the bag.
There was one partner whose initials were similar to mine. If you
were dyslexic, or simply careless in reading it, you could put the
wrong thing in the wrong box. That is exactly what happened on one
memo. I remember calling the group leader and telling him, "In this
case I want to do the following four things." And ... he sounded very
strange. He kept saying, "That's fine," you know, "That's good," like
"Yeah, I told you this." But I never received a memo until a partner
who had been out of town for five weeks came back and went
through his mail. Even though the memo was addressed to NF it
went to FN; someone didn't look at it carefully enough.
So ... the partner who sent me the memo ... was thinking: "You
idiot. That's what the memo says to do."... You'd think the partner
who mistakenly got the memo would -have said "Sorry. This was in
my box." Instead ... someone slipped it in my box.... I looked in
my inbox, and I read this memo, thinking, "This is really bizarre.
He's written me a memo today about all the things I've been doing
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for the last month. Then I looked at the date and realized what had
happened.... I had been through my "inbox" every day. Every day."
I never said that
I wrote memos to the file every chance I got. You couldn't get
anybody's ear long enough to really analyze a case or talk about
strategy. You would pass a partner in the hall, and he would blurt
something out to you. You would do exactly what the partner said to
do. Later on, when what you did didn't achieve a favorable result,
the partner would say, "I never said that. You must have misunder-
stood me." At first I thought, "No, I didn't misunderstand you." Be-
cause when a partner speaks, my antennae go up. I'm thinking, "This
is who I have to please, I'm going to get this absolutely 100 percent
correct." But after it happened a number of times (because in my
work I could never do anything thoroughly), I began to doubt wheth-
er maybe I did hear them wrong.
After that I never left my office without a pad of paper. If I hap-
pened to pass somebody in the hall and he started blurting out direc-
tions, I could start jotting things down.
Whenever I talked with anybody... within the firm or with an
adjuster on the telephone, I took contemporaneous notes, and wrote a
memo to the file and gave them copies. The memos always said: "If
this is not your understanding, contact me immediately." I found that
I was not only covering my own butt but I also was passing the
buck .... That was when I realized I was playing their game. I
didn't want to practice law that way. And so I left.
What made the experience difficult for me was that I liked the
people I was working for. On a personal level, they were fun, intelli-
gent, energetic. They were the kind of people I could enjoy in a social
setting. But upon closer scrutiny, it dawned on me that, if partner-
ship was the ultimate goal for me, I didn't want to be partners with
these people, because I wasn't comfortable with where they drew the
line on ethical issues. If I made partner, I would be held responsible
for the actions of my partners--and I didn't feel comfortable with
many of the practices that they either allowed or encouraged at their
firm.
Contrast
At my new firm, I can't tell you what a shocker it was to have the
partner I work for seeking me out two to three times a week to talk.
"What's going on in this case?... We should look into this. Call so
and so.". .. I'm working on a large plaintiff case, so we don't bill by
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the hour, but it's clear to me that it is the legal work that is the
primary concern. It is the work itself.
In another case.., we still don't know if there is insurance cover-
age for our client, but we are working.... We filed an answer on his
behalf, and if there is no insurance coverage, we are representing
him pro bono .... He can't afford to pay us.
My old firm didn't operate the way I have described a few years
ago. When I was a summer associate, there were only thirty-three
lawyers in the firm then. They were not trying to make as much
money as they possibly could. Then they got a taste of how much
money they could make... and their whole philosophy changed. They
didn't care about keeping associates.
I probably quit sooner than they wanted me to. They probably
hoped to get another year or two out of me before they got rid of me.
They don't want anybody staying five years, because then it costs
them too much. They like the idea of chewing them up and spitting
them out.
It's all about money.
What would cause this firm to trim its sails? What would cause the
lawyers to bill more honestly?
The sure-fire thing is to slap them with a lawsuit.., and have an
investigation to prove they are overbilling. That's why people have
audits. The fear of an audit is the thing that deters people from
cheating on their taxes.
I'd love... to see an ethical rule saying that nobody can bill more
hours than they work. Punch a clock. What time did you come in,
what time did you leave? You can't bill more than that many hours
in a day. Chances are you can't bill even close to that many hours.
But if you had people punch a clock, these guys would have their
secretaries punch the clock for them. Right?
I guess if people are determined to act unethically, they will al-
ways find a way to do so. My judge told me, "You've got to remember
that when you get into a courtroom just about everybody is lying."
And I said, "Why can't you do something about it?... Why doesn't
anyone get prosecuted for perjury?" He said,... "Not too many judg-
es are willing to do that." There is a fear of being the one who blows
the whistle.
I worked at a small law firm... before I went to this firm....
Those attorneys were incredibly ethical. I think it has to do with the
size of the firm. The bigger the firm, the bigger the opportunity for
billing misconduct. And the greater the need for it to cover your
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expenses, your overhead, and all those other things. The opportunity
is greater and the demand to produce is greater. Each feeds on the
other.
The small firm also did insurance defense work. I never once was
questioned ever about hours. You just do the work and bill what you
do.... I called them when I started having questions about the eth-
ics of this firm. They started laughing, and said, "We tried to subtly
say to you 'Are you sure you want to go work for such a large insur-
ance defense firm?'". .. As a young lawyer I didn't know what they
meant.... It had to hit me in the face with a two-by-four to make
me understand it.
The other firm is in a very tight-knit community. Everybody
knows each other. Many of them have been practicing together for
thirty-five years. I don't think you could get away with this type of
practice in that community. ... The firm I quit was in so many dif-
ferent jurisdictions and so many different courtrooms and had so
many different attorneys working for it, people didn't know what was
going on.
I spent a lot of time during the fifteen months I was at the firm
I've been describing talking to people at other firms, asking, "Have
they asked you to do this yet?" or "What do you guys do about that?"
It wasn't a lot of people,... probably about a half dozen. Some
worked at very large firms, some at small firms.... I didn't come
across anybody who was in the same mess that I was in, where three
months after you begin work there, and you can barely work your
voice mail and your computer, you have eighty files on your desk and
they are sending you to court.
Scrambling
I can't tell you the number of times I answered the phone and
somebody started talking to me about a case. I would be furiously
writing down notes, because I had no idea who I was talking to or
what case it was. I had this technique of asking general questions
and massaging the conversation so something would trigger. There
were times when nothing was triggered. I would hope that I had
enough information... even just the telephone number of whom to
call back. I would start through the files and think, now what case
could this possibly be? Here's one I haven't looked at in three
months. Maybe it's this one.
If it was the adjuster on the phone it didn't matter. The adjuster
knew there were 120 cases sitting on my desk. But if it was a client,
it drove me crazy because I kept thinking, "These people expect their
lawyers to be working hard for them. They have a right to expect
that."
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I was a fireman .... Everything I did was reactive.
I know plenty of ethical attorneys.... I know people who... cut
their bills just to be fair to clients. There are people out there like
that, but you have got to search for them. They are not so common.
Did you ever consider reporting the lawyers in your firm to the
disciplinary authorities?
Not really. It's clear to me that practically nobody reports unethi-
cal behavior. Attorneys have a strong self-preservation instinct. It's
the exceptional attorney who will put justice and integrity before
saving his own hide. No attorney wants to acquire the reputation of
being a snitch. Some attorneys probably don't report unethical con-
duct because they are concerned they will then become targets them-
selves. Others just don't want the complication and hassle to inter-
fere with their lives-it's easier to just look the other way and as-
sume that someone else will address it.
It's not just attorneys, either. I know a couple of attorneys who
have a long history of reprimands from the disciplinary agency.
These attorneys were recently found negligent in yet another case-a
case which was heard by a judge sitting as a finder of fact. The
judge's opinion states the attorneys committed malpractice. Yet none
of the attorneys involved in the case, nor the judge who made the
decision, bothered to report the attorneys to the disciplinary agency.
These attorneys are still practicing law.
The obligation to report misconduct is a sham. The rules don't
have any teeth, and as a result, the rules do little or nothing to deter
improper behavior.
COMMENTARY
A. What can we learn from Farber's story?
Farber's story does not tell us anything about the prevalence of
the type of firm culture he describes. I observe that ethical standards
at law firms vary enormously. I do not suggest that the type of con-
duct Farber describes is typical, but neither is it altogether uncom-
mon. But the point of this narrative is not to address the question of
prevalence. The point is to consider the events that Farber describes,
and to think about what they mean.
It is useful to name the problems identified in these stories. The
central one is that it appears that for many lawyers in the firm,
professional values have been subordinated to financial aspirations.
The lawyers are engaged in pervasive deception of clients, pretending
to be doing work that they are not doing, pretending to spend more
time than they are spending, pretending that work needs to be done
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which in fact does not need to be done. The delivery of legal services
is conceptualized principally as a billing opportunity to be manipulat-
ed and expanded. The relationships among the lawyers are more
predatory than collegial. Farber described a "mentoring" relationship
with the one lawyer in the firm who seemed interested in helping
him to become a better lawyer. But this one turned out to be a cha-
rade, yet another billing-driven interaction.
The law firm Farber describes is a moral wasteland. Every mem-
ber of the legal profession should shudder that we allow this type of
predatory behavior to occur under the guise of selling legal services.
We are supposed to be a self-regulated profession. Obviously in this
case the system is not working very well.
Nicholas Farber's account highlights the importance of our at-
tempting to discover the depth and breadth of the moral rot that has
taken hold of some portion of the legal profession, and to discover the
causes of this moral rot. Is this language too strong? I don't think so.
A lawyer who represents to a client that he has made a phone call
that was made by his secretary is deliberately deceiving the client for
the purpose of increasing his income. Likewise, a lawyer who bills a
client for half an hour's work for a phone call that took five minutes
and did not need to be made is deliberately deceiving a client for the
purpose of increasing his own income. Any self-respecting second-
grader could tell you that such behavior is wrong.
This firm, like so many others, started with laudable professional
aspirations. What happened? Apparently some of the partners lost
track of all but their personal financial goals, and gradually devel-
oped a culture in which the practice of law is primarily oriented
toward the generation of income. Our profession has developed a
fairly elaborate system by which to identify and address potential or
actual conflicts of interest between clients, but has yet to develop
such a system by which to address the basic financial conflict of
interest between lawyer and client.
While the lawyer regulators have been slow to attend to ethical
problems relating to lawyer billing practices, institutional clients and
some law firms have taken steps to develop such systems. Clients
have begun routinely to hire auditors to review lawyer bills, and
have adopted policies on what they will or will not pay for from their
outside counsel. Firms have established ethics committees and ethics
counsels to ensure that there is an institutional mechanism for re-
view of questionable practices. One firm even hired a full-time audi-
tor to monitor the billing practices of the lawyers in the firm.4
4. See Erin White, Legal Beat: More Law Firms Are Auditing Themselves to
Catch Billing Errors, WALL STREET J., Jul. 14, 1998, at B8.
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Disciplinary authorities and criminal prosecutors are increasingly
active in this arena.5 The disbarment and criminal prosecution of
several high-profile lawyers for billing and expense fraud has fo-
cussed attention on these issues and undoubtedly had some amount
of cautionary impact.6 While some progress is being made, most law
firms bill clients with little or no oversight or regulatory guidance.
Opportunities for undetected billing fraud abound. Institutional cli-
ents may have the means to protect themselves, to some extent, but
the auditors detect only the most flagrant abuses. Individual clients
are even more vulnerable.
Nicholas Farber declined to allow himself to be corrupted by his
firm, but instead found the door, and now has found some voice for
his concerns.7 But among the casualties of our professional preoccu-
pation with billing hours are many other lawyers who are more vul-
nerable to institutional or financial pressure than he was.
B. How serious is the misconduct described by Farber?
Some of the stories Farber recounts involve serious misconduct.
* One senior associate told Farber to find a reason to make a phone
call and write one or two memos per month on each of his files
whether they did or did not need attention in order to generate more
billable hours. He was reporting that he used this method to inflate
his own hours and he was encouraging Farber to do likewise.
* Another lawyer told Farber that he added up his hours each day
and inflated them if necessary to ensure that they totaled 8.6. He did
this to make sure he got his bonus and his vacation time. He encour-
aged Farber to use this method to increase his total billable hours.
5. See Randall Samborn, Sidebar: News of the Profession; Mayer, Brown and
Platt Overbillings Detailed, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1994, at A4 (discussing investiga-
tions by a state attorney discipline commission of improper billing practices); see
also Darryl von Duch, Best Snitches: Illinois Lawyers Land of Lincoln Leads the
Nation in Attorneys Turning in their Peers, NAT L L. J., Jan. 27, 1997, at Al (not-
ing that in 1984 attorneys reported 922 of their peers to disciplinary authorities).
6. See Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense
Fraud by Lawyers, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 1999) (study of seventeen
cases of billing and expense fraud by partners at elite law firms); see, e.g., Randall
Samborn, Fairchild's Sudden Fall Ends with Drop of a Gavel; Former Head of
Winston & Strawn Earns 24 to 30 Months for Embezzlement, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 9,
1995, at All (discussing disbarment of high-profile lawyer for stealing $780,000
from his firm and from five clients over a nine-year period); see also A Scandal
that Rocked Chicago Legal Circles May Make Wider Ripples Before Settling, NAT'L
L. J., Dec. 26, 1994, at C4 (discussing disciplinary charges of overbilling).
7. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExiT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970).
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* A common practice in the firm was to bill for creating a document
using a form as if the document had been written from scratch. The
lawyers would not bill for actual time spent, but for the amount of
time they thought they would have spent if the document had been
prepared solely for the client billed.
* A partner instructed Farber to change a pre-bill to list paralegal
time as attorney time to avoid a client ceiling on paralegal time per
month per case. This resulted in a misrepresentation of who did the
work, and probably resulted in the work being billed at a lawyer rate
rather than a paralegal rate.
+ Many attorneys billed at their own rates for work that was done
by their secretaries. The clients apparently had not consented to pay
by the hour for secretarial time, especially not at the hourly rates
charged by lawyers.
+ The lawyers were often instructed to represent time spent in con-
ference as time spent doing research to avoid client objections to
paying for this time. Likewise the lawyers were told to manipulate
their time sheets to misrepresent what was done when in order to
avoid client suspicions.
+ The style of supervision in the firm, far from encouraging compli-
ance with ethical rules, often encouraged unethical behavior.
These are only some examples of the misconduct Farber described.
The misconduct at Farber's firm arguably violates several different
ethical rules.8
Model Rule 1.4 requires a lawyer to "keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information," and to "explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation."9 The comments following
this rule note that "The guiding principle is that the lawyer should
fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with
the duty to act in the client's best interests .... A lawyer may not
withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or conve-
nience. "1°
This rule does not make clear exactly when a lawyer must come
forward with information, and is framed in terms of client requests
for information, but the rule should not be read to justify deliberate
deception of a client as long as the client does not ask a direct ques-
tion of the lawyer. Such a reading would suggest that a lawyer's
8. I refer to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for the purpose of this
discussion.
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1998).
10. Id. Rule 1.4 cmt.
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obligation to be candid toward a client is limited to avoiding deliber-
ate false statements, and that deception of clients is acceptable as
long as it can be accomplished by nondisclosure. The assumption
underlying the rule is that lawyers must act in their clients' best
interests. If the lawyer has reason to know that a client would want
to know certain information, the lawyer should disclose the informa-
tion to the client whether or not the client asks for it. A client of this
law firm who learned about the firm's billing practices would likely
make an informed decision to get a new lawyer.
Model Rule 1.5 requires that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reason-
able." The rule also provides that, "When the lawyer has not regu-
larly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be com-
municated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a
reasonable time after commencing the representation."2 While the
rule does not specifically prohibit any of the practices Nicholas
Farber described, the rule appears to contemplate that the reason-
ableness of a fee depends not just on the amount charged, but on
disclosure to the client of the method by which the fee is to be deter-
mined. The purpose of requiring disclosure of billing method is to
give the client information about how the fee is to be determined. If
hours are fabricated or padded, and the lawyer has contracted to bill
on the basis of actual time worked, the lawyer is subverting the
disclosure requirement.
The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
issued a formal opinion on hourly billing practices, interpreting Rule
1.5." The opinion explains that an hour is an hour and that if a
lawyer is billing a client by the hour, the lawyer who works one hour
only earns one hour's worth of fees. The lawyer may not bill more
time than was actually worked, and may not bill two clients for a
single hour unless each is billed for a fraction of the hour. The opin-
ion explains:
A lawyer [who has promised to bill by the hour] may not bill
more time than she actually spends on a matter, except to the ex-
tent that she rounds up to minimum time periods (such as one-quar-
ter or one-tenth of an hour)....
A lawyer who spends four hours of time on behalf of three clients
has not earned twelve billable hours. A lawyer who flies for six
hours for one client, while working for five hours on behalf of anoth-
er, has not earned eleven billable hours....
11. Id. Rule 1.5.
12. Id.
13. See Formal Op. 379, supra note 3 (discussing billing practices for profes-
sional fees, disbursements and other expenses).
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It goes without saying that a lawyer who has undertaken to bill
on an hourly basis is never justified in charging a client for hours
not actually expended."
The opinion notes that "a lawyer who agreed to hourly compensation
is... free, with full disclosure, to suggest additional compensation
because of a particularly efficient or outstanding result."" This does
not mean it is permissible to represent a premium as a block of ficti-
tious hours. Indeed, the opinion makes clear that the lawyer may not
charge any premium without explicit client consent. The point of the
ABA opinion is that lawyers should be honest with their clients
about the basis on which they calculate their bills.
Model Rule 3.3 requires lawyers to be truthful in dealing with
judges and other finders of fact.'" Model Rule 4.1 requires truthful-
ness in statements to "persons other than clients."7 There is no ex-
plicit rule requiring truthfulness in statements to clients. The ab-
sence of such a rule is based on the assumption that lawyers would
of course be truthful with their clients, and that the temptation to
deceive would be on behalf of a client.
Model Rule 7.1 addresses communication concerning a lawyer's
services." It is written principally with an eye to communication
with prospective clients. The drafters of the rule appear not to have
perceived a need to require candor toward existing clients. However,
the language is broad enough to cover both prospective and present
clients. The rule says "[a] lawyer shall not make a false or mislead-
ing communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A com-
munication is false or misleading if it ... contains a material misrep-
resentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading." 9 Many
of the practices described by Nicholas Farber would violate Rule 7.1.
If, for example, a lawyer billed a client at $250 per hour (the lawyer's
hourly rate) for an hour of time that actually was spent by the
lawyer's secretary, and the lawyer failed to disclose that he was
billing at his rate for secretarial time, this would be a false or mis-
leading communication about the lawyer's services. If the client has
prohibited billing for in-firm conferences, and the lawyer bills for
that time but represents the time as "legal research," this also is
false or misleading. In both instances the information is withheld
14. Id.
15. Id..
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3.
17. See id. Rule 4.1.
18. See id. Rule 7.1.
19. Id.
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because if disclosed, the client probably would decline to pay that
portion of the bill.
Model Rule 8.4(c) makes it professional misconduct for a lawyer to
engage in "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." ° The
sweeping prohibition of this rule, while general, perhaps offers the
clearest standard against which to measure the conduct described by
Nicholas Farber. This rule has been the basis of disciplinary action
for a wide range of lawyer misconduct that is not specifically prohib-
ited by other rules. The comment following the rule indicates that
misconduct that involves "dishonesty" or "breach of trust" are among
those that "reflect adversely on fitness to practice law."2 The com-
ment notes that "[a] pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor
significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to
legal obligation."22 The misconduct described by Nicholas Farber
might be considered by some lawyers to be inconsequential if one
looked at each incident separately. But the cumulative picture clearly
reflects adversely on the fitness of some of the lawyers in the firm to
practice law.
One might wonder if the ultimate fee seems reasonable, whether it
matters how the lawyer calculates the fee. Does it matter, for ex-
ample, if some hours are billed that are not actually worked? In fact,
it does matter. Many lawyers are habituated to representing all fees
in the form of hours worked, even if some of the hours listed are a
proxy for the lawyer's assessment of the value of the work rather
than the time spent. The "billable hour" has become a sort of fiction
in some firms. This misrepresentation contributes to the perpetua-
tion of a practice culture in which other types of deception are like-
wise treated as normal.' 3 Even if a client representative is informed
about the mischaracterization of time on a bill, the practice is prob-
lematic. Suppose a lawyer in the general counsel's office of a corpo-
rate client consents that a premium may be characterized on a bill-
ing statement as several extra hours worked. On another occasion a
lawyer might seek client consent to represent some hours worked as
expenses to be reimbursed directly to the lawyer. The lawyer and the
client might see no harm in this arrangement because the client
would pay the same number of dollars. Through this "consensual"
20. Id. Rule 8.4(c).
21. Id. Rule 8.4 cmt.
22. Id.
23. In a previous article I discussed this "slippery slope" problem, in which a
lawyer's integrity can be eroded by developing facility in the rationalization of
small deceptions, and that then larger deceptions cease to be the object of moral
reflection and instead become subjects for rationalization. See Lisa G. Lerman,
Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 680-682 (1990).
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deception, the lawyer might divert fees that should have been paid to
the law firm into his personal checking account, and, by representing
these fees as reimbursements, might not declare this payment as
income, and this lawyer would be engaged in tax fraud.'
Second, consider the implications of consensual misrepresentation.
If the client who consents to representation of a premium as hours
worked is an individual who pays her own bills, and the bills never
become the subject of any billing dispute, representation of premiums
as hours might deceive no one. But what if the client is a corporate
entity and the consent is obtained from the usual contact in the gen-
eral counsel's office? Even if the corporate representative consents,
corporate managers, accountants, or auditors who review bills might
be deceived by the representation that hours were worked that had
not been worked. Suppose further that the services are rendered in a
bankruptcy proceeding or in another context in which a judge or an
auditor would review and approve the legal fees. Any reviewer of the
time records who was not in the consent loop would be deceived by
the mischaracterization.
Perhaps this is an easy problem, a minor bad habit of many law-
yers. The problem is that in the practice of law, billable hours are
the coin of the realm. A lawyer's value to his law firm is most often
assessed primarily by the number of hours he bills. If a lawyer works
four hours on a matter that achieves a particularly good result and
after consultation with the client adds a $25,000 performance fee to
the bill, that portion of the fee might not be reflected in the number
of hours the lawyer had billed at the end of the month. At the end of
the year the lawyer's draw, raise, or bonus might not credit him for
having produced an extraordinary result in a trivial amount of time.
Firms that wish to discourage misrepresentation of premiums as
hours need to credit lawyers who generate firm income in the form of
premiums. Even better would be to shift to a system of evaluation of
lawyers that focussed on the quality of their work rather than on
their generation of income for the firm.
C. Does Farber have an ethical obligation to report his firm to the
disciplinary authorities? Do I?
"Nicholas Farber" reported numerous incidents that involved clear
and serious violations of ethical rules. Both Farber and I might be
charged with having failed to comply with ethical rules requiring
24. One lawyer who pled guilty to criminal charges that included allegations of
just this sort of shifting fees to expenses was H. Lawrence Fox, who was a part-
ner at Winston & Strawn. See Jonathan Groner, Ex-Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Mail
Fraud, Tax Charge, LEGAL TIMES, Jul. 20, 1992, at 16.
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attorneys to report serious misconduct to disciplinary authorities. I
have not identified the jurisdiction in which Farber was practicing at
the time, but let's assume he was in a jurisdiction that had a manda-
tory reporting rule that mirrors ABA Model Rule 8.3 and a rule on
responsibility of associates just like Model Rule 5.2.' I am a mem-
ber of the DC Bar, which has a mandatory reporting rule identical to
Model Rule 8.3.
Rule 8.3 requires reporting of violations of disciplinary rules that
raise "a question as to the honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness of the
person to be a lawyer.' The conduct Farber recounts involves
chronic patterns of purposeful dishonesty for the purpose of financial
gain. Some people would call it stealing. Reporting is arguably oblig-
atory. Even so, I do not fault Farber for having failed to make a
report to the disciplinary authorities, nor have I reported him for
having failed to report lawyer misconduct. (Nor, we might note, has
the judge he clerked for, whom he consulted repeatedly during his
work at this firm.) In fourteen years of teaching, I have consulted
with scores of law students and attorneys about ethical dilemmas
that they have encountered in practice. Those who sought advice
often were troubled by the misconduct that they had observed and
took their ethical responsibilities very seriously. I have on many
occasions raised the question of whether there was a reporting obli-
gation with respect to the reported misconduct. Those who consulted
me often agreed that the misconduct in question was serious enough
to satisfy the 8.3 standard. But as far as I know, none of these law
students or attorneys ever decided to report the misconduct.'
Why not? For a law clerk or an associate to report allegations of
unethical behavior by a lawyer in his or her firm to a disciplinary
agency is tantamount to professional suicide. Our profession requires
reporting but provides no protection to those who comply with the
rule. Howard Wieder was fired by his firm for insisting that the firm
report misconduct by another lawyer in the firm. After years of liti-
gation, the New York Court of Appeals decided that the firm's right
to fire an at-will employee did not include the right to fire him for
insistence on compliance with an important ethical standard.' The
25. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2, 8.3 (1998).
26. See D.C. R.P.C. 8.3.
27. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1998).
28. The one exception is that in a few instances, students or colleagues who
consulted me about academic misconduct then complied with a reporting obligation
imposed by a law school rule similar to 8.3.
29. See Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 109 (N.Y. 1992) (reversing dismissal
of wrongful discharge claim of attorney who alleged he was dismissed for insisting
that his law firm report misconduct by another associate in the firm; court held
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Texas Supreme Court just considered a similar question raised by
Collette Bohatch, who was fired after she tried to persuade her part-
ners to investigate her allegations that another partner was engaged
in massive billing fraud. The Texas court upheld the firm's firing of
Bohatch. °
Wieder and Bohatch did not go directly to the disciplinary agen-
cies, but had the courage to urge their firms to comply with the
rules. They were courageous enough to litigate their rights. How
many law clerks or associates, most of whom have at least $80,000 of
student loans to repay, would display such courage? Far from duck-
ing his ethical responsibilities, "Nicholas Farber" has a high level of
ethical sensitivity and a powerful sense of professional responsibility.,
He quit his job without having another. Even telling the stories
anonymously, he is taking professional risks by participating in this
discussion. Most lawyers who find themselves in situations like
Farber's would be too intimidated to speak about the problems, ex-
cept in private.
The question of my own reporting obligation has been raised by
others who have read my previous anonymous reports from other
attorneys.31 Query whether those who raise this question would pre-
fer that the legal profession and the public not look too closely at the
ways that lawyers exercise their discretion in billing clients.
Might Farber be relieved of his obligation to report misconduct by
an obligation to protect client confidences? I think not. The alleged
misconduct is by lawyers, not clients, and could be disclosed without
revealing client confidences. If anything, he might have an additional
obligation to report the billing fraud to his clients as well as to the
disciplinary authorities.
Do I have an obligation to report to disciplinary authorities the
misconduct that was reported to me by Nicholas Farber? Maybe not.
I do not know the names of the lawyers whose conduct is described
in the interview. This purposeful ignorance is not an attempt to ma-
nipulate my way around a reporting obligation, but is rather an
effort to be vigilant in the protection of confidences that I have re-
ceived from Farber. It is easier to avoid inadvertent revelation of
information that one does not possess. However, one consequence of
my not knowing the identity of the lawyers or the firm is that I do
that lawyer's duty to report misconduct is an implied term of every lawyer's em-
ployment contract).
30. See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, No. 95-0934, 1998 WL 19482, at *5 (Tex.
Jan. 22, 1998).
31. I have not told other stories in such depth as this one, but I have pub-
lished other unattributed stories in Gross Profits: Questions About Lawyer Billing
Practices, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 695 (1994), and Lying to Clients, supra note 23.
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not have the "knowledge" that would trigger a reporting obligation.
As far as I know, I have no obligation to investigate. Am I obliged to
report Farber for not reporting his colleagues? I don't think so. I do
think he has violated Rule 8.3, but this violation does not raise a
question about his "honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects."32 Far from it.
D. Was Farber unduly scrupulous in his billing practices?
Is Farber sometimes hyper-ethical? Farber expressed concerns
about billing a client for time spent thinking about a case while
mowing the lawn or sitting on the bleachers at a ball game. If this
time is productive, is it properly billable? The problem is that if the
lawyer is billing on the basis of productive time worked, the judg-
ment of productivity is left entirely to the subjective discretion of the
lawyer. A lawyer who has a high opinion of his own productivity
might bill twice as many hours as one who was just as productive
but had a more modest ego. A lawyer who is more adept at rational-
ization can define productivity more broadly and thereby justify
billing more hours. This standard sidesteps the question of whether
the client should be consulted or informed about what the lawyer is
doing while billing hours. How many clients would be happy about
paying $300 per hour for time their lawyers spent "thinking" while
mowing the lawn?
If a lawyer is permitted to bill for time spend thinking or talking
about a client matter while 'engaged in another activity, the system
incorporates no discount for the diminution in productivity that
might result from doing two things at the same time. A lawyer who
is thinking while in the shower or driving a car generally cannot
make notes or consult sources. A lawyer conferring with a colleague
during a baseball game might be distracted by a home run, the pop-
corn salesman, or the weather. Some clients might agree to pay for
time spent working in these circumstances, but most would object.
Given the hourly rates lawyers charge, it is unfair to charge for time
when the lawyer's attention is divided unless the client consents
after full disclosure of the circumstances.
Did Nicholas Farber worry needlessly about billing for time spent
reading files that were transferred often because of the rapid turn-
over of associates in the firm? The question is whether a firm should
disclose to a client that a matter was transferred two or three times
and give the client a voice in the judgment of what is proper. A client
of Farber's firm, for example, might have found that a substantial
32. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1998).
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portion of the time billed on some matters was for associates reading
the files when the cases were passed on to them.33
Many lawyers assert that it is proper for them to bill intra-office
conferences among attorneys and then criticize clients who object to
this. While collaborative work is undoubtedly better quality than
solitary work, it is not always more efficient. Some clients might
elect for more efficiency even if some sacrifice of quality is involved.
But the principal reason for client complaints about billing for intra-
office conferences is not about the value of the time, but the ease and
frequency of inflating this type of billing time either by marking up
the time spent or by simply chatting longer. Many clients are strug-
gling to find some tools by which to limit the "blank check" phenome-
non inherent in agreeing to be billed by the hour. A more effective
method of accountability might be for more legal clients to negotiate
fees (not billing methods) in advance of receiving legal service. Those
who continue to work with lawyers who bill by the hour worry with
good reason that lawyers exercise unfettered discretion about how
much time to work and how much time to say that they worked.
Perhaps many clients would prefer dishonest or inflated billing to
incompetent service from their lawyers. But clients should not be
asked to choose between competent service and honest billing. Law-
yers who believe that they are undercompensated by hourly billing
arrangements should propose alternative methods to set their fees.
As long as firms evaluate lawyers based on the number of hours they
bill, this is easier said than done. But just as clients should not be
expected to tolerate deception by lawyers, lawyers should not be
asked to participate in a billing system that rewards both inefficiency
and dishonesty.
E. Should lawyers stop billing by the hour?
One obvious solution to the problems of deception, mistrust, and
abuse that arise in connection with hourly billing would be for law-
yers to abandon hourly billing and use a different method to deter-
mine their fees. Perhaps they should follow the example of auto me-
chanics, and provide each client with a written estimate of the cost of
the work before undertaking representation. Like car mechanics,
lawyers could commit to charge no more than the amount estimated.
Then clients would have price information at the outset and might
have an opportunity to negotiate the fee to be charged.
33. If the high turnover of associates was caused by poor work conditions or
by discontent with unethical behavior, should a client be asked to absorb the extra
cost?
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Some lawyers argue that the problems with hourly billing have
been caused by cost-conscious clients. Corporate clients are accused
of having lit or at least fed the fire of billing fraud by setting up in-
house counsel's offices which began to demand from outside counsel
detailed information about the basis of the fees being charged.
It is true that many clients have become mistrustful of lawyer
billing practices. But their concerns are simply the product of a bill-
ing practice that gives lawyers total discretion over how much to
charge and which provides little disclosure to clients or opportunity
for clients to negotiate fees.
Hourly billing, became popular among lawyers because lawyers
found it more lucrative than the methods they had previously em-
ployed.' Professor William Ross notes that the move to hourly bill-
ing was prompted principally by a recognition that this method
would increase the incomes of the lawyers who used it. Ross reports
in his excellent book, The Honest Hour, that
[s]tarting as early as the 1940s, management experts concluded
from various studies that lawyers who kept time records earned
more than attorneys who did not. Management experts advised
lawyers to raise their compensation by selecting a target annual
salary and dividing that figure by the number of hours that they
could bill to a client during a year and factoring in overhead costs in
order to arrive at an hourly billing rate.35
While most lawyers do not set out to bill dishonestly, the choice of
billing methods in the legal profession has long been driven by con-
cerns about the lawyer's pocketbook, not the client's. Viewed from
this perspective, clients are unhappy with hourly billing for the same
reasons that lawyers prefer it-it leads to higher bills and gives
lawyers discretion over how much to charge.
Legal audit firms and corporate policies restricting billing emerged
in response to a feeding frenzy of overbilling that developed in elite
law firms during the late 1980s. Many lawyers find it burdensome to
deal with client billing policies and legal auditors, but the profession
made this hard bed for itself by tolerating and encouraging bill pad-
ding, fabrication of time records, and other deceptive practices. The
34. See WILLIAM G. Ross, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED
BILLING BY ATTORNEYS 17 (1996) (noting that many American lawyers began bill-
ing by the hour during the 1950s, and quoting one management consultant who
wrote in 1960: "'lawyers who do keep personal time records have a net income
which is almost equal to the gross income of lawyers who do not keep time re-
cords. Need more be said!'" (quoting Eugene C. Gerhart, The Art of Billing Clients,
1 LAW OFF. ECON. & MGMT. 29, 37 (1960))).
35. Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
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assessments of what is good legal service and how much should be
billed for that service is not a judgment to be made by lawyers alone.
Many lawyers feel aggrieved by the restrictions imposed by clients
on the number of hours that a firm may bill for particular activi-
ties.' Some perceive corporate clients of the 1990s as penny-pinch-
ing; they believe that the restrictions are unnecessary. The restric-
tions on billing that Nicholas Farber describes (e.g., fifteen hours of
paralegal time per matter) might better be characterized as a desper-
ate and often ineffectual attempt by corporate clients to set some
boundaries on the "blank check" otherwise represented by an hourly
billing contract. As long as lawyers bill by the hour, these problems
will persist.
36. The ABA opinion on hourly billing practices states that while lawyers
should not bill for more hours than they work, clients should not impose unrea-
sonable restrictions on how many hours lawyers can bill them. "An unreasonable
limitation on the hours a lawyer may spend on a client should be avoided as a
threat to the lawyer's ability to fulfill her obligation under Model Rule 1.1 to
provide competent representation to a client." Formal Op. 379, supra note 3. Per-
haps this exhortation is couched in passive voice because it would be awkward to
argue that clients are bound by the rules of professional conduct.
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